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Abstract
In this paper we run a laboratory experiment in order to investigate
the impact of incidental emotions on individual risk-taking. In partic-
ular, we induce sadness and happiness by means of audiovisual stimuli
and compare the subsequent risky choices with the baseline thanks to
a between-subjects design. A tweaked version of the Multiple Price
List method is used to elicit individual risk preferences in the context
of three different lotteries. As main result, the experimental sub-
jects exhibit greater risk aversion under sadness or happiness, than
under neutral conditions. Therefore, we explain the findings through
the theory of ego depletion, whereby controlling emotions so as to
subsequently process information consumes a limited self-regulatory
resource, which is necessary to take risks as well. The outcome is
detected in the first lottery but not from the second lottery onwards,
probably due to unchecked order effect.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, choice behavior is undoubtedly regarded as the fruit of two inter-
acting processes: the former more deliberative and rational, whereas the lat-
ter more impulsive and driven by emotions (Kahneman and Frederick (2002);
Loewenstein et al. (2015)). As far as risky decision making is concerned,
scholars have been mainly interested in modelling choice behavior by consid-
ering only the rational part of the story, such as in the case of the Expected
Utility Theory. However, in the last decades some elements belonging to the
affective sphere have been included thanks to Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky (1979); Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), like insensitivity to
probabilities and loss aversion. Within such a model, Brandsta¨tter et al.
(2002) further tried to explain the inverse S-shape of the probability weight-
ing function as a result from anticipating emotion related to the future realiz-
ation of a risky payoff. Anyway, modelling emotions unrelated to the decision
at hand becomes even trickier, especially if we consider the disagreement of
the existing experimental literature about the effect of the specific type of
emotion on the behavioral outcome.
Thus, this paper aims at reaching a better understanding of how dis-
crete incidental emotions can influence risky decision making, given that
far-reaching implications for organizational contexts could derive from this
strand of literature: transient feelings are capable of directing the behavioral
outcome over time. Indeed, after a certain decision is made under the influ-
ence of emotion and this feeling vanishes, yet individuals keep on making new
choices consistent with the initial decision driven by the incidental emotion
(Andrade and Ariely, 2009).
In order to make a contribution to this burgeoning research branch, we
run a laboratory experiment where the participants undergo a so-called emo-
tion induction procedure that consists of an audiovisual stimulus triggering
sadness, happiness or neutral emotion. At this point, the players participate
in three different lottery-choice tasks structured according to the Multiple
Price List format (Binswanger, 1980), so that we can obtain a risk-taking
indicator of individual choices and detect possible emotional influence on
the basis of the between-subject design. By further enhancing the analysis
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through an ordered logit model, we find that both sad and happy individuals
are more risk-averse than those in a neutral mood. In the end, we speculate
that the emotions experienced before the lotteries deplete the psychological
resources required to take risks, in accordance with a past application of
ego depletion theory (Unger and Stahlberg, 2011). The result is detected
in the first lottery but vanishes from the second lottery onwards, presum-
ably because of unchecked order effect. Since salient financial incentives are
provided, finally each participant is paid according to the decisions made
during the lottery-choice tasks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a dis-
cussion on the possible sources of disagreeement within the literature, by
bringing up topics like the definition of emotion and the existing methods to
elicit risk aversion. Section 3 describes the experimental design. The results
are presented in Section 4, where, after checking for the effectiveness of the
emotion induction procedure, we propose two analyses of risk behavior as
well as discuss possible explanations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Kinds of affect and methods to elicit risk
preferences
Since the last decade, the enigmatic relation between emotion and risk-taking
has caught the attention of many scholars, especially in the field of Experi-
mental Economics, and has been widely analyzed, leading some researchers
to the formulation of two opposed theories: the Affect Infusion Model (AIM)
(Forgas, 1995) and the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis (MMH) (Isen and
Patrick, 1983). On the one hand, the former approach suggests that good
mood brings to risk-seeking behavior, that is, people in a good mood per-
ceive the risky choice as more favorable. At the same time, individuals in
a bad mood prefer to stay conservative because they are pessimistic about
risky outcomes. On the other hand, the latter thesis supports the opposite
behavior, namely, subjects in a good mood are usually risk-averse because,
in case they lose a gamble, they are going to lose not only the monetary
amount, but also their positive emotion. Furthermore, people should strive
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to change negative emotional state and take more risks. Having a look at
the experimental evidence, we observe a really mixed context and findings
at odds with each other: some authors, like Nygren et al. (1996) and Chou
et al. (2007), encounter positive correlation between good mood and risk
taking behavior; instead other works, like Chuang and Lin (2007) as well
as Kliger and Levy (2003), show opposite results that support the MMH.
Finally, it is not uncommon to come across intermediate conclusions, such
as the case of Conte et al. (2016) who show that both positive and negative
emotions increase the willingness to take risks, or Drichoutis and Nayga Jr
(2013) reaching an opposite conclusion.
This conflicting evidence could be due to two main causes, that is, the
difference in meaning between mood and emotion, and the various risk elicit-
ation methods. Indeed, scholars have broadly used the terms mood, emotion
and affect as synonyms, but there is a clear distinction as far as Psychology
is concerned. According to Robbins and Judge (2012), affect defines a broad
range of feelings that people experience, including both emotion as an in-
tense short feeling coming from a specific stimulus, and mood, depicted as a
less intense feeling which lasts for longer time. Anyway, since our experiment
includes a multisensory stimulus, herein we focus on emotions.
Going through the research area of decision making under risk, the mean-
ingful distinction between anticipated or expected emotion and immediate
emotion is to be pointed out. As in Rick and Loewenstein (2008), the former
refers to predictions about the emotion that agents will experience after
knowing the outcome of their own choice, whereas the latter corresponds
to the immediate reaction at the time of decision making, and in turn falls
into one of two categories. Indeed, even if connected with the consequences of
one’s decision, integral emotion is experienced at the time of decision making
and provides individuals with more thorough information about their own
tastes. Finally, incidental emotion is felt during decision making but totally
unrelated to the choice at hand, and represents the object of this paper.
Furthermore, connected with the issue of the definition, it has been shown
that different emotions with the same valence (i.e., with the same emotional
sign) trigger different risky behaviors. For example, Raghunathan and Pham
(1999) and Lerner and Keltner (2001) show that fear, anger and sadness, usu-
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ally all classified as “negative emotion”, impinge differently on risk aversion
with respect to each other. Accordingly, in order to avoid typical ambiguity
of the valence-based approach (Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2006), in the current
work we prefer to focus on specific feelings, that is, sadness and happiness.
The second reason why the previous literature disagrees could be asso-
ciated with the different experimental methodologies used for eliciting indi-
vidual risk aversion. In accordance with Charness et al. (2013), we can cite
among them:
• The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002). In this
kind of experiment the only task is to pump a series of virtual balls. For
each pump the participant wins 5 cents in a temporary account and,
at whatever moment of game, she can decide to move the amount in a
permanent account. In this case a new small ball appears. Instead, if
the balloon bursts before moving the money, then the player loses the
amount in the temporary account and a new balloon appears. On the
one hand, the larger becomes the ball, the higher is the amount in the
temporary account; on the other hand, the burst probability increases
with the dimension of the ball. The measure of risk aversion is the
adjusted number of pumps, whereby a high number of pumps denotes
risk-seeking behavior.
• The Gneezy and Potters Method (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). In this
game players receive a certain amount and have to decide how much to
invest in a risky option which offers a certain dividend. The difference
between the initial amount and the investment in the risky choice is
kept by the player. The higher the investment, the lower the risk
aversion level.
• The Multiple Price List Method (MPL) (Binswanger, 1980). The task
consists in choosing within a list of paired lotteries, where each choice
of the list usually includes a safe lottery and a risky gamble. Therefore,
players choose the preferred option for each row, and the sum of safe
choices in each list is used as rough measure of risk aversion. The
main feature of this method is that each choice is associated with a
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specific coefficient of relative risk aversion, which is computed under the
assumption of a specific form of the utility function, namely, preferences
are modeled according to a Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility
function (CRRA).
Since this is merely an exemplifying list, we refer the reader to Andersen
et al. (2006) for a review of the most relevant risk elicitation methods.
To sum up, studies grounded on different kinds of affect or different risk
elicitation methods have led to dissimilar findings, and comparisons among
them are questionable as well.
Therefore, some caveats about these two features are necessary before
moving on. Even though for the sake of simplicity we are going to employ
the terms emotion and mood without distinction throughout the paper, we
are actually interested in understanding the impact of incidental sadness and
happiness on risk aversion, by using a MPL method to elicit risk preferences1.
3 Experimental design
We conduct four different treatments in four different sessions, following the
same scheme in each one: (i) a first stage in which, after a brief socioeconomic
questionnaire is filled in, we convey a specific audiovisual stimulus and check
for its efficacy, (ii) a second stage in which the participants make risky choices
by using our version of the Multiple Price List method.
Since we are interested in analyzing the effect of different kinds of emotion
on risk aversion, we use the audiovisual stimulus as control variable and
employ four treatments that can be distinguished just on the basis of it.
According to the existing literature, several techniques are suitable to elicit
a specific emotion, as Westermann et al. (1996) also highlighted. Indeed,
each mood induction procedure can be classified as simple if only one of the
techniques is used, or combined in case more techniques are implemented
together. Following some useful advice (Mayer et al., 1995), we combine
two of the eleven existent methods, namely, images in addition to music, in
1In the same way, for the sake of simplicity we are going to alternate the adjective
happy with positive/good, as well as sad with negative/bad.
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order to avoid ineffective induction procedures. In particular, referring to
the communicative theory of emotions (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 2008), we
assume that only four basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anxiety and anger)
can be evoked through music. Therefore, we focus on sadness and happiness
in addition to two control treatments, selecting musical pieces which are
supposed to induce negative, positive or neutral conditions; moreover, we
choose sad, happy or neutral pictures to be shown during the listening phase
of the respective treatments, in order to enhance the wished emotions.
Therefore, we run four different sessions:
• the N-treatment (negative treatment), in which the participants listen
to few minutes of the musical piece “Polymorphia” by Penderecki ac-
companied by negative images, so that they can experience sadness;
• the P-treatment (positive treatment) in which we select Bernstein’s
track “Mambo” and some positive pictures, in order to induce happi-
ness;
• the CS-treatment (control treatment with audiovisual stimulus), in
which we propose an excerpt from the neutral piece “Symphony n.40”
by Mozart2 in addition to a few neutral images; and finally
• the C-treatment (control treatment), without music or pictures.
In the following sections, sometimes we will cluster the observations coming
from the N-treatment and the P-treatment, and refer to them as Emotional
treatments. In the same way, we will name Baseline the data combined from
the CS-treatment and the C-treatment.
A summary of the whole mood induction procedure is shown in Table 1,
whereas a description of the manipulation check is contained in subsection
4.1.
Moving to the second phase, the risk aversion elicitation task consists
of three lotteries based on a MPL method similar to that one proposed by
Abdellaoui (2000), Ding et al. (2010) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011), namely,
2This piece of music is contained in a list of pieces that Va¨stfja¨ll (2002) judges to be
suitable for neutral conditions.
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Table 1: Treatments
Emotional Treatments Baseline
N-treatment P-treatment CS-treatment C-treatment
Participants 35 30 30 28
Emotion Negative Positive Neutral Neutral
Stimulus yes yes yes no
a list in which players can choose ten times either a risky option (i.e., a
fixed probability to win an amount of money), or a safe amount. The main
difference between our game and Holt and Laury (2002)’s version lies in the
fact that Holt and Laury considered a list of paired risky options, as shown
in Table 2. Indeed, in that case the safe choice is represented by Option A,
whose payoffs are less variable than Option B but still risky.
The MPL method is one of the most used formats to elicit individual risk
aversion, and its pros and cons are highlighted by Andersen et al. (2006). His
popularity is due to simplicity of the structure and the possibility to gather
lots of observations and pay just one of the choices by random selection,
without decreasing the salience of payments (Laury, 2005). Going back to
Table 2, by the last row any subject should cross over to Option B, thereby
making manifest her own risk preferences. In contrast, the main disadvantage
of this format arises from the occurence of multiple switch points, which
according to Charness et al. (2013) could be due to misunderstanding of the
instructions and, accordingly, seen as inconsistent behavior.3Andersen et al.
(2006), instead, argue that such a conduct can be considered as indifference
between choices. All in all, since in our setting we include an explicit choice
for indifference between the safe and the risky choices (i.e., a specific row
of the table where to cross over to the other option) and we still observe
inconsistent choices, the occurrence of multiple switch points is probably due
to lack of attention or scarce comprehension of the instructions. However,
3For example, Jacobson and Petrie (2009) in a field experiment found 55% of incon-
sistent choices.
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Table 2: Ten paired lottery proposed by Holt and Laury (2002)
Nr. Option A Option B
1 p = 1/10 of 2.00, p = 9/10 of 1.60 p = 1/10 of 3.85, p = 9/10 of 0.10
2 p = 2/10 of 2.00, p = 8/10 of 1.60 p = 2/10 of 3.85, p = 8/10 of 0.10
3 p = 3/10 of 2.00, p = 7/10 of 1.60 p = 3/10 of 3.85, p = 7/10 of 0.10
4 p = 4/10 of 2.00, p = 6/10 of 1.60 p = 4/10 of 3.85, p = 6/10 of 0.10
5 p = 5/10 of 2.00, p = 5/10 of 1.60 p = 5/10 of 3.85, p = 5/10 of 0.10
6 p = 6/10 of 2.00, p = 4/10 of 1.60 p = 6/10 of 3.85, p = 4/10 of 0.10
7 p = 7/10 of 2.00, p = 3/10 of 1.60 p = 7/10 of 3.85, p = 3/10 of 0.10
8 p = 8/10 of 2.00, p = 2/10 of 1.60 p = 8/10 of 3.85, p = 2/10 of 0.10
9 p = 9/10 of 2.00, p = 1/10 of 1.60 p = 9/10 of 3.85, p = 1/10 of 0.10
10 p = 10/10 of 2.00, p = 0/10 of 1.60 p = 10/10 of 3.85, p = 0/10 of 0.10
as far as our analysis is concerned, the issue of multiple switch points is not
relevant, as we are going to clarify in Section 4.
Our three lotteries, whose specifications are shown respectively in Table
3, Table 4 and Table 5, have the following peculiarities:
• Lottery 1: the safe choices (Option A) range from 100 to 190, while
the amount and the win probability of the risky choices (Option B) are
constant.
• Lottery 2: the safe choices (Option A) are constant and equal to 100,
whereas the win probability of the risky choices (Option B) gradually
increases from 0.1 to 1.
• Lottery 3: whilst the safe choices (Option A) are represented by a con-
stant loss equal to −20, the risky choices (Option B) involve increasing
probability to lose 100.
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity we call Option A and Option B the
choices in all the three lotteries and, concerning the risky options, we always
impose the choice between a risky amount of money and zero to make the
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Table 3: Lottery 1
Choice number Option A Option B
p = 1/2 p = 1/2
1 100 of 300, of 0
2 110 of 300, of 0
3 120 of 300, of 0
4 130 of 300, of 0
5 140 of 300, of 0
6 150 of 300, of 0
7 160 of 300, of 0
8 170 of 300, of 0
9 180 of 300, of 0
10 190 of 300, of 0
game as clear as possible and avoid misunderstandings, as implemented in
Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Shupp et al. (2013).
Table 3 shows the lottery in which we vary the riskless amount and fix
the gamble: we expect that a risk neutral person will choose Option B six
times before switching to Option A.
Table 4 shows the lottery in which we fix the amount of the safe choice,
while the probability to win the gamble changes: here we expect that a risk
neutral person will choose Option A four times before switching to Option
B.
Table 5, finally, shows the lottery defined in the loss domain: players have
to choose between a small sure loss and a risky option in which it is possible
not to lose anything. In this case, we expect that a risk neutral person will
choose Option B two times before switching to Option A.
The experiment was conducted in May 2014 in the Laboratory of the
Faculty of Economics “Giorgio Fua`”, Universita` Politecnica delle Marche
(Ancona, Italy) and involved 123 participants (59 females). Having ran-
domly assigned the participants to one of the four sessions, we read aloud
the instructions at the beginning of each turn and then players took their
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Table 4: Lottery 2
Choice number Option A Option B
1 100 p = 1/10 of 250, p = 9/10 of 0
2 100 p = 2/10 of 250, p = 8/10 of 0
3 100 p = 3/10 of 250, p = 7/10 of 0
4 100 p = 4/10 of 250, p = 6/10 of 0
5 100 p = 5/10 of 250, p = 5/10 of 0
6 100 p = 6/10 of 250, p = 4/10 of 0
7 100 p = 7/10 of 250, p = 3/10 of 0
8 100 p = 8/10 of 250, p = 2/10 of 0
9 100 p = 9/10 of 250, p = 1/10 of 0
10 100 p = 10/10 of 250, p = 0/10 of 0
Table 5: Lottery 3
Choice number Option A Option B
1 -20 p = 1/10 of -100, p = 9/10 of 0
2 -20 p = 2/10 of -100, p = 8/10 of 0
3 -20 p = 3/10 of -100, p = 7/10 of 0
4 -20 p = 4/10 of -100, p = 6/10 of 0
5 -20 p = 5/10 of -100, p = 5/10 of 0
6 -20 p = 6/10 of -100, p = 4/10 of 0
7 -20 p = 7/10 of -100, p = 3/10 of 0
8 -20 p = 8/10 of -100, p = 2/10 of 0
9 -20 p = 9/10 of -100, p = 1/10 of 0
10 -20 p = 10/10 of -100, p = 0/10 of 0
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place in the cubicle. After starting the game, the participants read again the
instructions in their own screen, filled in the questionnaire and were invited
to put on the headphones to get involved in the feeling suggested by music
and images. Since salient financial incentives were provided, in the end the
players were paid according to the decisions made during the lottery-choice
tasks, in order to increase the incentive to behave correctly and reveal true
preferences. Indeed, regarding each participant we randomly drew one of
her choices in each lottery and paid her in accordance with the sum of these
values. The experiment lasted about 40 minutes and the average payment
amounted to 8 euro, including a show-up fee of 3 euro.
4 Results
In this section we are going to show and comment on the results of the
experiment. Firstly, we test the efficacy of the mood induction procedure.
Secondly, the data related to each lottery are analyzed by using the individual
number of risky choices as risk-taking indicator. Thirdly, we rely on the
ordered logit model as suitable tool for enhancing the study. Finally, a general
discussion is provided to shed light on possible explanations.
4.1 Manipulation check
Before moving to the results, a few issues have to be clarified.
Throghout the paper, (i) we always combine the data from the CS-
treatment and the C-treatment, assuming that they both fostered neutral
conditions. At the same time, (ii) we hypothesize that the N-treatment in-
duced sadness, whereas the P-treatment elicited happiness.
In order to test such hypotheses, immediately after the audiovisual stim-
ulus and before Lottery 1 we asked players to report a self-evaluation of their
own emotion by using a 6-point Likert scale (Matell and Jacoby, 1971) and
a series of adjectives.
Table 6 shows that the adjectives were different on the basis of the treat-
ment. Indeed, in the N-treatment we asked about only negative feelings,
whereas in the P-treatment we used just positive adjectives. In this way,
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Table 6: Mood questions after the stimulus
Emotional Treatments Baseline
N-treatment P-treatment CS-treatment C-treatment
How much are Sad Happy Sad Sad
you ..... from 0 Worried Carefree Happy Happy
to 5? Scared Serene
Doubtful Determined
we wanted to enhance the impact of music and pictures as well as we were
able to avoid experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010), since it is not in-
tuitive what risky decisions good (or bad) mood should trigger. In other
words, the emotion measurement itself was part of the induction procedure,
but preserved validity because at the same time let individuals not give false
answers, as in Campos-Vazquez and Cuilty (2014).
Anyway, this design allows us to compare the responses related to sadness
and happiness, that are object feelings of study.
By so doing, in Figure 1 we easily see that the procedure of clustering
both the control treatments under the label Baseline is validated, because
no differences in moods were found.4
Furthermore, the boxplot in Figure 2 suggests that players in the N-
treatment were actually sadder than those in the Baseline. At the same
time, individuals in the P-treatment seem to be happier than those in the
Baseline. This impression is supported by the Wilcoxon rank sum test in
Table 7.
Therefore, we theorize that the emotion induction procedure was success-
ful and the behavioral outcomes in subsections 4.2 and 4.3 are due to the
different emotions experienced at the time of decision making.
4Comparing the CS-treatment and the C-treatment by means of Wilcoxon rank sum
test, neither the intensity of sadness (z = 0.60, p-value= 0.55) nor the degree of happiness
(z= 0.20, p-value= 0.84) were significantly different.
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CS-treatment C-treatment
Figure 1: Intensity of moods in the control treatments
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 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
Sad Happy Sad Happy
N-treatment P-treatment Baseline
Figure 2: Intensity of moods
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Table 7: Comparison of inducted moods distributions
Nonparametric test
N-treatment vs Baseline* P-treatment vs Baseline**
Wilcoxon z= 4.17 z= 2.23
p-value (0.00) (0.02)
*Sadness is compared.
**Happiness is compared.
4.2 The individual number of risky choices as risk-
taking indicator
As stated in Section 3, in this phase of the experiment we use a tweaked
version of the MPL format due to its simplicity and appropriateness for
eliciting individual risk preferences. When highlighting the pros and cons
of this approach, Andersen et al. (2006) stress the understandability of the
structure as well as its flexibility to incentives as main advantages, whereas
they indicate the possibility of multiple switch points as chief drawback.
On the one hand, the same authors argue that this kind of behavior can
be seen as indifference between choices, but on the other hand Charness
et al. (2013) suggest that the occurrence of multiple switch points is due to
misunderstanding of the instructions.
As said before, since in our design we include an explicit choice for in-
difference between the safe and the risky choices (i.e., a specific row of the
table where to cross over to the other option) and we still observe incon-
sistent choices, our conclusion is that the inconsistent behavior is arguably
due to lack of attention or scarce comprehension of the instructions. Indeed,
if we pool all the observations, in the first lottery 49 out of 123 subjects
(39.84%) make inconsistent choices, but the trend decreases to 19 parti-
cipants (15.45%) in the second lottery and 33 individuals (26.83%) in the
third one, thanks to the learning effect. This evidence is highlighted in Fig-
ure 3, where the proportion of inconsistent subjects is represented by the
dark blue bars.
Anyway, in our case the issue of multiple switch points is not relevant,
15
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Lottery 1 Lottery 2 Lottery 3
Inconsistent subjects Consistent subjects
Figure 3: Proportion of inconsistent subjects in each lottery
since the total number of safe (risky) choices within a single lottery can be
used as individual risk aversion (risk-taking) indicator, as Holt and Laury
(2002) point out.
Focusing on the first lottery, we remind the reader that the probability
of winning the risky option is held constant and equal to 50%, while the
amount of the safe option gradually increases from 100 to 190. Therefore, a
risk neutral person is expected to choose Option B six times, before switching
to Option A.
In Figure 4, we show the proportion of risky choices made by the players
in each decision. Having drawn a grey line to indicate the prediction under
the hypothesis of risk neutrality, the percentage of risky choices falls very
quickly after the fifth choice both in the N-treatment and in the P-treatment.
Whereas, in the Baseline more than 30% of the participants still prefer the
risky option until the last choice.
Since the players in a neutral mood seem to be more risk lover than the
others, such a result could suggest that the induction of positive or negative
16
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Figure 4: Proportion of risky choices in each decision - Lottery 1
emotions increased risk aversion.
In order to check if our graphical analysis is significant, we compare our
treatments with respect to the individual number of risky choices by running
the Wilcoxon rank sum test, whose results are shown in Table 8 together with
the summary statistics. The nonparametric test rejects the null hypothesis,
underlining that the participants in a positive or negative mood are actually
more risk averse than the individuals in a neutral mood.
Furthermore, no noteworthy results come out of the comparison between
the N-treatment and the P-treatment.5
The second lottery differs from the previous one with respect to two
peculiarities: in this case the amount of the safe option is held constant and
equal to 100, while the probability of winning the risky option increases from
0.1 to 1. Moreover, the risk-neutral prediction involves going for the safe
option four times, before switching to the risky one.
5We check if the difference between the risky choices in the Emotional treatments is
significant, but the Wilcoxon rank sum test is not able to reject the null hypothesis (z =
1.25; p-value = 0.21).
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Table 8: Comparison of risky choices distributions - Lottery 1
Summary statistics
N-treatment P-treatment Baseline
Mean 4.66 5.13 5.79
Median 5 5 6
Standard deviation 1.71 1.59 2.21
Nonparametric test
N-treatment vs Baseline P-treatment vs Baseline
Wilcoxon z= -2.96 z= -1.88
p-value (0.00) (0.05)
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Risk-neutral prediction
Figure 5: Proportion of risky choices in each decision - Lottery 2
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Table 9: Comparison of risky choices distributions - Lottery 2
Summary statistics
N-treatment P-treatment Baseline
Mean 4.91 5.17 5.28
Median 5 5 5.5
Standard deviation 1.40 1.51 1.93
Nonparametric test
N-treatment vs Baseline P-treatment vs Baseline
Wilcoxon z= -0.95 z= -0.25
p-value (0.34) (0.81)
Taking into account these modifications, in Figure 5 we illustrate the risky
choices made by players in each decision. This time, at first sight nothing can
be said about potential divergent patterns of behavior among treatments,
since no line seems to stand out from the maze. Such an impression is
confirmed by the Wilcoxon rank sum test in Table 9, where we also display
the summary statistics and find no differences between groups.6
Finally, the third lottery is defined in the loss domain: the amount corres-
ponding to the safe option is fixed and equal to -20, whereas the probability
of losing money in the risky option gradually increases from 0.1 to 1. This
time, any risk-neutral subject is expected to choose Option B twice, before
crossing over to Option A.
As we see in Figure 6, the relative trend of risk choices is quite similar
to the previous lottery despite the different framework, in the sense that the
proportion of risky choices in each decision falls in a homogeneous way, and
does not seem to be affected by the specific emotional state. The insight
is demonstrated in Table 10, where we fail to reject the null hypothesis of
significantly different distributions.7
6No difference is also detected between the two Emotional treatments (z = 0.53; p-value
= 0.59).
7In the same way, also in this case the two Emotional treatments do not significantly
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Figure 6: Proportion of risky choices in each decision - Lottery 3
Table 10: Comparison of risky choices distributions - Lottery 3
Summary statistics
N-treatment P-treatment Baseline
Mean 3.17 3.23 3.26
Median 3 3 3
Standard deviation 1.67 1.52 1.90
Nonparametric test
N-treatment vs Baseline P-treatment vs Baseline
Wilcoxon z= 0.14 z= 0.18
p-value (0.89) (0.86)
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Table 11: Comparison of invested sum distributions
Summary statistics
N-treatment P-treatment Baseline
Mean 160.66 152.60 221.33
Median 80 80 100
Standard deviation 217.68 213.11 276.44
Nonparametric test
N-treatm vs Baseline P-treatm vs Baseline N-treatm vs P-treatm
Wilcoxon z= -0.98 z= -0.86 z= 0.05
p-value (0.33) (0.39) (0.96)
Summing up, in Lottery 1 both participants in a good mood and subjects
in a bad mood were more risk averse than people in a neutral mood, but this
evidence disappeared from Lottery 2 onwards.
In order to understand whether our findings can actually be attributed to
the emotions experienced, we rely on the initial questionnaire and check for
the risk preferences that we had elicited before the mood induction procedure
through the following question:
• “You are given the opportunity to buy a financial product which with
the same probability allows you to win 1000 euro or to lose the invested
sum. How much are you willing to pay for such a financial product?”
As depicted in Table 11, when we compare the answers to the question by
treatment, the Wilcoxon rank sum test finds no differences between groups:
the subjects in the Emotional treatments seem to be initially as risk-averse
as the players in the Baseline, unlike results in Lottery 1. This fact enhances
the results of the study.
differ in the risk-taking indicator (z = -0.04; p-value = 0.97).
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4.3 The ordered logit model
As further proof in favour of the previous findings, in this subsection we
include the ordered logit model as appropriate tool to describe our data. In-
deed, for each lottery we cumulate all the 123 observations, thereby obtaining
three models. In each of them, the dependent variable is represented by:
• our Risk-taking indicator, which consists of a sum of risky choices ran-
ging from 0 to 10. Therefore, it is a discrete ordinal variable whereby
we assume that higher values correspond to higher risk-seeking. This
measurement is carried out after the mood induction procedure, if any.
Moreover, we include the following variables as regressors:
• Emotions : it is a dummy assuming the value of 1, in case the subject
belongs to either the N-treatment or the P-treatment. Otherwise it is
equal to 0, denoting neutral emotion. In this way, we equalize both the
individuals in a good mood and the players in a bad mood, following
the results in subsection 4.2. Therefore, our hypothesis is that such a
variable is statistically significant in Lottery 1, but not from Lottery 2
onwards.
• Invested sum: it is a continuous variable displaying the answer to the
risk-related question that we reported in the previous subsection. That
question, contained in the initial socioeconomic questionnaire, aimed at
measuring risk aversion before the mood induction procedure. There-
fore, by including this variable in the model, we try to isolate the effect
of Emotions from the individual endowment of risk aversion.
• Female: it is a dummy equal to 1 in case gender is feminine, and 0
otherwise. In this way, we control any possible gender effect on the
dependent variable.
In Table 12 we calculate the coefficients via maximum likelihood estima-
tion (MLE) for all the three lotteries.
In Lottery 1, the negative coefficient of the variable Emotions means that
the fact of participating in either the N-treatment or the P-treatment involves
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Table 12: Ordered logit models
Dependent variable: Risk-taking indicator
Lottery 1 Lottery 2 Lottery 3
Emotions -0.967*** -0.193 0.248
(0.342) (0.327) (0.328)
Invested sum 0.001 0.001* 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.047 -0.522 0.892***
(0.324) (0.326) (0.334)
Observations 123 123 123
Log-likelihood -239.643 -225.429 -226.2066
LR test χ2(3) = 51.86 χ2(3) = 50.23 χ2(3) = 51.46
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
***Significant at the 1 percent level
**Significant at the 5 percent level
*Significant at the 10 percent level
lower Risk-taking indicator, that is, it makes the subject more risk-averse.
The related significance at the 1 percent level leads us to conclude that the
previous findings are confirmed. Indeed, neither Lottery 2 nor Lottery 3
displays significance of Emotions.
As additional result, it comes out that in Lottery 3, when it is possible
to make a loss, females want to avoid safe losses at all costs and accordingly
take more risks. In this final lottery, the behavioral outcome is driven by the
initial willingness to gamble, rather than the emotions experienced.8
4.4 Discussion
At this point, solid ground is present to visualize how sadness and happiness
impacted on risk-taking. Accordingly, we search for possible explanations:
• on the one hand, the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995) is
8This could be ascribed to the very definition of emotion as temporary feeling, but
more research is needed to prove this speculation.
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consistent with pronounced risk aversion of sad individuals, but fails to
account for similar risk attitude of happy subjects;
• on the other hand, the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis (MMH) (Isen
and Patrick, 1983) justifies caution shown by players in a good mood,
but is not consistent with the reduced risks taken under the influence
of sadness.
Clearly, these two theories do not explain our data, and it is necessary to
look for alternative explanations.
Therefore, we theorize that the phenomenon known as ego depletion
(Baumeister et al., 1998) played a crucial role during risky decision making.
According to this theory, controlling emotions and processing information
are only two of some activities consuming a limited self-regulatory resource,
which can be seen as kind of energy. Once this resource is even partly used,
subsequent performance on self-control-related tasks will be undermined.
Concerning the consequences on risky decision making, we follow the
approach proposed by Unger and Stahlberg (2011), whereby two types of
risk behavior should be distinguished. If the decision task is represented by
a gamble without perceived control over the final outcomes, like in the case of
playing roulette, then ego depletion conditions are expected to increase risk-
taking. Whereas, if the task at hand is embodied by a responsible economic
decision involving the selection of several options different with respect to
outcome probabilities and payoffs, then ego depletion leads to risk aversion.
However, both the negative and the positive potential consequences of the
decision have to materialize immediately, and not only in the distant future.
Otherwise, reduced self-control fosters risk-seeking behavior like in the case
of smoking, whose negative effects arise after ages but emotional rewards are
instantaneous.
Relying on these arguments, we think that our experimental subjects
employed their own self-regulatory resources in order to control bad or good
emotions and participate in the subsequent three lotteries. Since these lotter-
ies did not demand the simple decision of participating or not, but entailed
reasoning about outcome probabilities and payoffs, we conclude that ego
depletion caused risk aversion.
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Indeed, according to Fischer et al. (2007) subjects under ego depletion
become less optimistic about their own chances. The authors show that the
construction of positive views of the self requires the same above-mentioned
self-regulatory resource, because such positive illusions can need “activit-
ies such as defending own standpoints, biased memory encoding and re-
trieval, suppression of threatening information, or selective devaluation of
self-inconsistent evidence”(Fischer et al., 2007, p. 1307). Therefore, lack of
optimism triggered by ego depletion could further explain the greater risk
aversion observed in the Emotional treatments in Lottery 1.
Finally, as far as the different findings in Lottery 2 and Lottery 3 are
concerned, we speculate that possible order effects represent the limit of this
investigation, and could have influenced the final outcomes. Indeed, our
design confounded order and treatment effects because all the three lotteries
were always carried out in the same order, making arduous any possible
interpretation.
Also for this reason, supplementary investigations are desirable to cor-
roborate the fascinating ego-depletion story.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we ran a laboratory experiment in order to investigate the effect
of incidental emotions on individual risk-taking. In particular, we tested in
a controlled environment the potential of audiovisual stimuli to induce sad,
happy or neutral emotions that, in turn, could affect individual behavior
when the subjects were supposed to make risky choices. A modified version
of the well-known Multiple Price List (Binswanger, 1980) method was used in
order to elicit individual risk preferences by means of three different lotteries.
The main finding of the study is that individuals in the N-treatment (neg-
ative treatment) and in the P-treatment (positive treatment) were more risk
averse than those in the Baseline. This comes out of two different analyses:
the former was based on the individual number of risky choices as risk-taking
indicator, whereas the latter focused on the ordered logit model as appro-
priate econometric tool. We theorize that both sad and happy players were
affected by the phenomenon known as ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998),
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which could have led them to greater risk-averse behavior through less op-
timistic expectations about the future (Fischer et al., 2007). The result is
detected in the first lottery but vanishes from the second lottery onwards,
presumably due to unchecked order effect.
In any case, these findings add new empirical evidence to a literature
which is still in its infancy, given that the two chief psychological theories
of emotions and risk-taking (AIM and MMH) are not supported. Definitely,
additional research is needed to have a firm grasp of the role of emotions in
risky decision making.
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